Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy by Reese, Willis L. M.
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO STATUTES:
THE DEFENSE OF PUBLIC POLICY
WiLus L. f. RFESE*
HE MdAJOR AREA OF UNCERTAINTY in the field of full faith and
credit involves the extraterritorial effect that must be accorded
the statutes of sister states." The clause itself makes no distinc-
tion between statutes and judgments and provides generally that "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records
and judicial Proceedings of every other State.'12 Such a distinction, how-
ever, was sharply drawn by the original statute passed in implementation
of the clause; whereas it provided expressly that judgments should enjoy
"such faith and credit... as they have.., in the courts of the State...
from which they are taken," it was silent with respect to the measure of
credit owing to statutes. 3 In the absence of any documentary evidence on
the point, 4 it is at least plausible to attribute the latter omission to a reali-
zation on the part of Congress that the problem of full faith and credit to
statutes involved many unexplored complexities and to a consequent be-
lief that the field was not yet ripe for legislative action but rather should
be left to the courts to be worked out on a case-to-case basis.
What has been suggested above may be made clearer by a brief exposi-
tion of why the problems presented by statutes are more complex than
those encountered in the case of judgments. The principal reason is simply
the fact that normally there is but one judgment to be reckoned with, and
the rare case of competing judgments can be disposed of with relative
ease by according enforcement to that which was rendered last in point of
time.s As such, the law relating to foreign judgments revolves largely
around defenses against their enforcement, an area which is sufficiently
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precise and definite to lend itself readily to legislative rule making. At
the time of the implementing statute's enactment, the enforcement of
foreign judgments had already become a common practice in Anglo-
American jurisprudence.6 Therefore, it involved only a small break with
the past to put the enforcement of sister state judgments on a mandatory
basis. More important still for our purposes, this step, in the light of past
experience with foreign judgments, was one whose results and repercus-
sions could in large part be envisaged in advance. After all, assuming that
a given judgment had been rendered at a fair trial and by a court with
jurisdiction over the parties and after proper notice to them, why should it
not be enforced as of right in another state? To be sure, situations could
be expected to arise where such enforcement would run counter to the in-
terests and policies of the second state, 7 but should not such occasional
inconveniences be overborne by the strong unifying principle embodied
in the full faith and credit clause, which was designed to further the needs
of a unified, albeit federal, nation?' So, at least, it may have seemed to
the framers of the statute.
Quite different in this regard was the situation presented by sister
state statutes. Here, problems involving choice of law would be met at
each turn, for, in every case with contacts in two or more states, decision
must first be made as to which one of the competing laws should properly
be applied to govern the question at hand. Thus, any wholesale attempt to
require application of sister state statutes would in effect place the entire
field of choice of law upon a constitutional plane. Such a result, if it had
been deemed desirable, could have been achieved in either one of two
ways. First, the framers of the statute could have enacted a comprehen-
sive set of choice of law rules which all of the courts, both state and federal
alike, would have been obligated to follow. Such an ambitious program, if
it had been attempted, would almost certainly have proved a failure for
the very simple reason that a satisfactory statute cannot be drafted unless
at least a majority of the problems involved in the field can be answered.
And clearly, the framers of the implementing statute did not know the
answers to all the problems posed by choice of law, for even with the
benefit of a century and a half of further experience we do not know them
now. What provisions, for example, should a statute seeking to regulate
6 Page, Full Faith and Credit: The Discarded Constitutional Provision, [1948] Wis. L. Rev.
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choice of law in the field of contracts contain? All that we know with cer-
tainty is that it is impossible to govern the entire field by a single rule, and
to say, for example, that all questions of validity should be governed by
the law of the place of making, or by that of the place of performance, etc.
What is clearly required is a series of narrower rules, tailor-made to fit the
many different types of contracts as well as the multitude of diverse prob-
lems that may arise in connection with each. But, with minor exceptions, 9
the present state of our knowledge is simply not sufficient to tell us what
the content of these narrower rules should be. In other words, the field of
choice of law with respect to contracts is not yet ripe for legislative action.
And, for similar reasons, the same is probably also true of all other aspects
of choice of law, as, for example, those relating to torts, property inter-
ests, domestic relations, corporations, etc.
Alternatively, the framers of the implementing statute could have
drafted some general formula which made clear that rules relating to the
extraterritorial application of sister state statutes (i.e., choice of law rules)
came within the constitutional domain, but which made no attempt what-
soever to state what the content of these rules should be. By this means,
Congress would in effect have placed upon the Supreme Court the duty of
drawing a comprehensive set of choice of law rules for the country at
large. This solution would have avoided the difficulties inherent in draft-
ing legislation in an informational vacuum; it would not, however, have
been without its disadvantages. First of all, it would have imposed a heavy
burden on the Supreme Court which would have been obliged to hear at
least a substantial portion of the choice of law cases arising throughout
the nation. Secondly, although the Court would have the advantage of
deciding problems only as they arose, it too would suffer from the general
dearth of information on the subject and hence would almost inevitably
render decisions that would prove erroneous in the course of time. And
such decisions, since they would be binding on state and lower federal
courts alike, might have unfortunate consequences until they were over-
ruled.
There is, of course, no way of telling whether these difficulties were in
the minds of the framers of the implementing statute, and, if so, whether
such difficulties caused them to remain silent with respect to statutes. At
any rate, the fact that these difficulties do in fact exist is manifested by
the vacillations of the Supreme Court in wrestling with the subject.
9 For example, the courts are in general agreement that an alternative reference rule should
be used to sustain the validity of a contract against the defense of usury. Cheatham, Goodrich,
Griswold and Reese, Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws 471-77 (3d ed., i951).
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Roughly speaking, the decisions of the Court in this area may be said
to fall within two categories, the one negative, and the other positive:
() those which forbid a state from applying its own local law to a transac-
tion because of the demands of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and (2) those which compel a state to apply another's law
on the ground of full faith and credit. At first, the Court tended to lay
down strict rules on the subject. Thus, in the insurance field, it was held
a vi6lation of due process for a state, other than that where the contract
of insurance was technically made, to apply its own law to determine the
rights of the insured under the policy."' Conversely, full faith and credit
was held to require application, in the case of fraternal benefit associations,
of the law of the state of incorporation" and, in the case of workmen's
compensation, of the law of the place where the contract of employment
was entered into, so long, at least, as that law purported to provide an
exclusive remedy."2 The Court has persistently adhered to its original
position so far as fraternal benefit associations are concerned, 3 but
otherwise all else has been changed. Due process no longer forbids a state
from applying its own law unless it has no reasonable contact with the
transaction, 4 and, where such a reasonable contact exists, full faith and
credit does not compel a state to apply another's law in preference to its
own. s In other words, further experience with the subject has induced
the Court to withdraw almost entirely from the field of choice of law.
Another situation, divorced from the complexity of choice of law,
may also be said to fall within the second (positive) category of decisions.
In Broderick v. Rosner, 6 suit was brought in New Jersey by the New York
Superintendent of Banks against certain stockholders of an insolvent
bank to recover their statutory liability. The complaint was originally
dismissed by the state court because under New Jersey law such an action
would not lie unless all of the corporation's creditors and all of its stock-
holders were joined as parties. This action, however, was reversed by the
10 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge,
246 U.S. 357 (1918).
,'Modem Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (I925); Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S.
531 (1915).
12 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
'3 Order of Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
14 Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1942); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S.
397 (1930).
zS Pacific Ins. Co. v. Comm'n, 3o6 U.S. 493 (i939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v Comm'n, 294
U.S. 532 (1935).
16 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
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Supreme Court as a violation of full faith and credit, because the New
Jersey statute imposed "a condition, which, as here applied, is impossible
of fulfillment"'' 7 and a state "may not, under the guise of merely affecting
the remedy, deny the enforcement of claims within the protection of the
full faith and credit clause, when its courts have general jurisdiction of
the subject matter and the parties."',' This case, of course, did not present
any problem of choice of law, since New Jersey was not seeking to apply
its own law to the transaction. It was merely refusing to entertain in
its courts suit upon what was admittedly a New York cause of action;
this, the Supreme Court held, it could not do.
A further source of complication has now entered upon the scene. As
part of the 1948 revision to the Judicial Code, the implementing statute
was amended so as to provide that both statutes and judgments alike
should be accorded the "same full faith and credit" throughout the
country "as they have ... in the courts of such State ... from which
they are taken."' 9 What, if anything, was intended to be accomplished by
this amendment is by no means clear, since, so far as appears, it was en-
acted by Congress without discussion and the Revisers' Notes state
simply that it "follows the language" of the full faith and credit clause
itself .20 Taken literally, however, the amendment would seem to consti-
tute a clear mandate that the Supreme Court should henceforth interject
itself more forcibly into the field of choice of law. Will the Court, however,
feel obligated to assume such a task in view of the uncertainty as to the
amendment's purpose? This, undoubtedly, is the most crucial question in
the field of full faith and credit today.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Hughes v. Feter" does little
to clarify the problem; indeed Justice Black states explicitly in his majori-
ty opinion that it was found "unnecessary to rely on any changes accom-
plished by the Judicial Code revision."- The decision is important, how-
ever, for two reasons. First, the case involves a situation in the realm of
statutes which appears eminently suited for a hard-and-fast rule of full
faith and credit. Second, the fact that four Justices dissented provides
at least some indication that the present Court is unlikely to depart far
from its present position of self-abnegation so far as the question of full
faith and credit to statutes is concerned.
17 Ibid., at 639.
is Ibid., at 643.
X9 62 Stat. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § x738 (1948). 21 341 U.S. 6o9 (ig5i).
20 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1948) at 505. - Ibid., at 613 n. x6.
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The facts of the case were these: The decedent, one Harold Hughes,
was killed in an automobile accident in Illinois as the result of the alleged
negligence of the defendant, Fetter. Suit, based upon the Illinois wrongful
death statute, was thereupon brought in a Wisconsin state court by
plaintiff, Hughes' administrator, against Fetter and his insurance com-
pany. It appeared that both of the individual parties were residents of
Wisconsin, that the defendant insurance company was incorporated in
that state, and that the decedent, Hughes, had likewise been residing
there at the time of his death. Upon motion of the defendants, the trial
court dismissed the complaint on the merits, because in its view the Wis-
consin statute, by creating a right of action only for deaths caused in that
state, evinced a public policy against the entertainment of suits brought
under the wrongful death acts of other states. This action was affirmed
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court 23and the case was then taken on appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States, which reversed with, as has
already been noted, four Justices dissenting.
In the course of his majority opinion, Justice Black stated that "full
faith and credit does not automatically compel a forum state to subordi-
nate its own statutory policy" to that of another state; "rather, it is for
this Court to choose in each case between the competing public policies
involved.' '24 He noted, however, that, since Wisconsin was not seeking to
apply its own wrongful death statute, instead of that of Illinois, "to
measure the substantive rights involved, ' --S the "narrow question" pre-
sented was simply whether Wisconsin "can close the doors of its courts to
the cause of action created by... Illinois .... ,,16 In short, the "basic con-
flict" involved was not between the public policies of two or more states,
but between that of Wisconsin and "the strong unifying principle embod-
ied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause looking toward maximum enforce-
ment in each state of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the
statutes of sister states." In these circumstances, it was held that "Wis-
consin's policy must give way." Since Wisconsin had a wrongful death
statute of its own, it could have "no real feeling of antagonism against
wrongful death suits in general. ' '27 Also, "relevant, although not crucial
here" was the fact that, while in the present case jurisdiction over at least
the individual defendant could apparently have been obtained in Illinois
by substituted service, "in other cases Wisconsin's exclusionary statute
23 257 Wis. 35, 42 N.W. 2d 452 (1950).
24 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 6I (i95 ). 26 Ibid., at 61i.
2s Ibid., at 612 n. 1o. 27 Ibid., at 612.
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might amount to a deprivation of all opportunity to enforce valid death
claims created by another state.1'28
The dissent, written by Justice Frankfurter and concurred in by
Justices Reed, Jackson and Minton, asserted that the "dominant" con-
cern of the states in the local administration of law "should not be sacri-
ficed in the interest of a merely literal reading of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. ' ' 29 Although it was admitted that "[iun the field of commercial
law-where certainty is of high importance, ' 30 deference had at times been
required either to the law of the state of incorporation or to that of the
place of contract, it was said that in tort actions, where there is no similar
need for the predictibility of ultimate consequences, "there is little reason
to impose a 'state of vassalage' on the forum."31 As such, the action of the
Wisconsin courts should not be reversed so long as there was a "reasonable
basis" for that state to close its courts to the Illinois cause of action. Such
a reasonable basis was said to be provided by the difficulty of applying a
foreign statute whose details might differ widely from that existing at
the forum. "The [Wisconsin] legislature may well feel that it is better to
allow the courts of the State where the accident occurred to construe and
apply its own statute, and that the exceptional case where the defendant
cannot be served in the State where the accident occurred does not war-
rant a general statute allowing suit in the Wisconsin courts. ' ' 32
In many respects, the most surprising thing about the case is the
number of Justices who joined in the dissent. It will be noted that, whereas
the majority found it possible to reach their decision without reliance upon
the recent amendment to the implementing statute, the minority, al-
though they did not in terms refer to the amendment, must obviously
have thought that even its sweeping language did not govern a case
scarcely distinguishable on its facts from the Supreme Court's earlier
holding in Broderick v. Rosner.33 As such, it is difficult to avoid the con-
clusion that, in spite of the amendment, a substantial minority of the
Court will prove unwilling to extend further the scope of full faith and
credit with respect to statutes.
One further aspect of the decision deserves mention. Wisconsin was
not here trying to apply its own law to the transaction; therefore the case
was not concerned with the impact of full faith and credit upon the com-
plexities of choice of law. Nor was the refusal of the Wisconsin court to
23 Tbid., at 613. 31 Ibid., at 617.
29 bid., at 620. 32 Ibid., at 61g.
301 bid., at 6i 5. 33 294 U.S. 629 (i935).
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entertain the suit based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens or
upon the ground that Illinois law provided a peculiar remedy which they
themselves would be unable to grant. The only question presented was
whether, on the ground of public policy, a state can close its courts to a
cause of action arising under the laws of a sister state. It is seriously ques-
tioned whether this should ever be permissible.
A hard-and-fast rule requiring the states to entertain sister state causes
of action would certainly further the central purpose of the Full Faith and
Credit clause, which was to "alter the status of the several states as inde-
pendent foreign sovereignties ... and to make them integral parts of a
single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be
demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of its origin."34 Such a pro-
posed rule would operate in a narrow area, totally free from any com-
plexities posed by choice of law, and, moreover, would be one whose re-
sults and repercussions could clearly be envisaged beforehand. For it is
now firmly established that full faith and credit requires the enforcement
of a sister state judgment even though that judgment was based upon a
cause of action utterly repugnant to the forum's law. 35 The principle
underlying this latter rule seems equally applicable to the field of statutes.
To be sure, entertainment of a sister state cause of action, in contrast to
the enforcement of a judgment, does require the forum court to apply the
law of another jurisdiction. But this burden is only one of the costs of a
federal system; to say, as the minority would seem to suggest, that a
state can escape its constitutional obligations on this ground means
simply that, so far as statutes are concerned, the Full Faith and Credit
clause is dead.
34 justice Stone in Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, at 277 (I935).
3s Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (I9O8).
